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0. Preamble 
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to pay tribute to Saunders MacLane. Like 
many, many others my first contact (as an undergraduate) with modern abstract 
algebra came via the book [ 11, “A Survey of Modern Algebra.” More recently, his 
book [2], “Categories for the Working Mathematician,” has been an invaluable 
reference and before that his Bulletin article [3], “Categorical Algebra,” provided 
an excellent rapid introduction to the subject. 
In personal contacts (all too few), he has been warm, thoughtful, and 
provocative. 
1. The motivation 
A couple of years ago, despairing that progress in the foundations of the theory 
of computation was taking place much too slowly, I came to the conclusion that 
what was needed was a “suitable” framework for such a theory. On the one hand 
sufficient detail and decisions would have to be worked out in such a way as to 
promise an attractive, perspicuous and incisive theory, and on the other hand, the 
framework would have to be sufficiently broad to allow many different kinds of 
questions to be asked and answered. Independent studies carried out within the 
framework would be insured a measure of cohesiveness. The perspective gained 
would permit judgments concerning the importance of and the relationships among 
the various questions. One conclusion concerning the nature of the framework 
which has been slowly evolving in my mind: the language of categorical algebra 
would be essential. 
* Prepared for the volume commemorating the “Symposium on algebra.” in honor of Saunders 
XlacLane. held in Aspen. Colorado, &la) 3-27. 1979. 
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2. The anomaly 
The importance that I attached (and still do) to the framework enterprise, 
together with the conclusion reached, immediately provided a pressing puzzle: only 
the most elementary and basic concepts of category theory were central for the 
framework. Indeed the oft-quoted dictum - which it seems to me is quite consistent 
with present category theoretic activity - to the effect “the reason for defining 
‘category’ is to define ‘functor’ and the reason for defining ‘functor’ is to define 
‘natural transformation’...” seemed strikingly at odds with both those aspects of 
category theory which I found most useful in the past (cf. [4]) as well as those 
aspects which I anticipated would be most useful in the future. But these latter have 
been, for the most part, not sufficiently clear to attempt to elucidate. The con- 
ference at Aspen stimulated this first, very small, attempt to give these matters voice 
even though the ideas involved have not yet fully crystallized. 
3. The potential new roles 
Two not entirely disjoint new roles that I will briefly discuss are: 
(1) category theory as a tool for applied mathematics; 
(2) category theory as a common foundation for theoretical computer science 
and finirei.v describable mathematics. 
An esample will facilitate the discussion. I will define a certain category by 
presentarion. Here “presentation ” is meant in a sense analagous to the familiar \vay 
one presents groups. A presentation definition does not presume the thing defined 
to pre-exist but rather con.sIrucfs it. 
4. Presentation of the category D-Sta (D-stack) 
The category D-Sta has five objects: a terminal object 1, “generator” objects D 
and S, the product object D x S and the coproduct object 1 + (D x S). Aside from 
the identity morphisms and the structural morphisms associated with the terminal, 
product and coproduct objects, D-Sta contains “generator” morphisms n ; 1 --S, 
p : D x S-S, and 0 : S-+ 1 + (D x 5) subject to the relations 
B 0 (/1, p) = Is, the identity on S, 
(/1, P) 0 B=Il+,n.s,. 
[Here, if 1 A 1 +(Dx.S) G DxS is the coproduct associated with the 
coproduct object 1 + (D x S), then (/1, p) is the unique morphism which satisfies the 
two equations: 
II 0 (A> p)=A, fD*S 0 (A, p)=p. 1 
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Additional morphisms in D-Sta are generated by the requirement that composition 
compatible pairs of morphisms have a composite, as well as by the requirement that 
D-Sta be closed under the pairing operations induced by products and coproducts. 
The entire category D-Sta may be succinctly represented by the following 
commutative diagram 
l+(DxS) +$ s. 
5. The intuitive basis for D-Sta 
The category D-Sta may be faithfully represented by a subcategory of the 
category of sets by taking: 
S= D*= set of ail finite sequences of elements of D; 
p : D x D*-tD* takes (x, 10 into xu, XE D, u E D* (this is the “push” aperation); 
n : 1 --+D* has as value the sequence /1 of length 0; 
8, the “pop” operation is uniquely specified as the inverse of (A, p). 
The category D-Sta is intended to explicate a particular mode of storing and 
retrieving information. The stack variable S may be correlated with a storage 
register which is capable of storing any element u ED*. The push operation takes a 
specified XE D and changes the “value” of the variable S or the “state” of the 
register S from u to XU. Similarly, the “pop” operation, in case the length U, of u is 
positive both provides an .YE D and changes the value of the variable S to I/ where 
U=XU’; in the case 1~1 =0 “pop” provides some indication of this fact. 
There are many discussions of the stack example in the computer science 
literature. All incorporate some version of “push” and some version of “pop”. 
Of the more mathematical treatments of this example, our treatment falls some- 
where inbetween the treatment [5] of Guttag, Horowitz, and Musser and the 
treatment [6] of Lehman and Smyth. See also [7], Thatcher, Wagner and IVright, p. 
28, for a discussion of this example. Our treatment shares its constructive character 
with [5] but in essence, shares its explication of “stack” with [6]. 
Time doesn’t permit the development of explications of “data types” other than 
stack. 
It should be clear, however, that the method of presentution of categories has 
broad application. Reference [4] provides another illustration of direct use of 
category theoretic ideas to a computer science topic. 
6. Concerning the common foundation 
Lawvere, [8], starts off his article on “The Category of Categories as a 
Foundation for Mathematics” as follows: 
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In the mathematical development of recent decades one sees clearly the rise of the conviction that 
the relerant properties of mathematical objects are those uhich <an be stated in terms of their 
abstract structure rather than in terms oi the elements which the objects were thought to be made 
of. The question thus naturally arises whether one can give a ioundation for mathematics which 
expresses wholeheartedly this conciction concerning what mathematics is about, and in particular 
in Hhich classes and membership in classes do not play any role. Here by “foundation” we mean 
a single system of first-order axioms in N hich all usual mathematical objects can be defined and 
all their usual properties proved. 
Lawvere’s approach to the Foundation serves as a first approximation to the goal 
(2). It takes the point of view, however, that all categories pre-exist while I would 
like to construct categories as required. Lawvere wants his Foundation to be capable 
of defining and proving the usual things while I seek an incisive tool for re- 
examining much of mathematics that exists and which would serve as well as a guide 
in creating new mathematics (including theoretical computer science). On a more 
detailed level, I would like the underlying logic to be quantifier-free and regard the 
treatment of composition (in categories) as a ternary relation to be a distortion. The 
underlying language I have (only vaguely) in mind would gain power by having 
available the ability to describe general algorithmic procedures for introducing new 
functions and having available, for proof, a principle (or principles) of mathe- 
matical induction. Indeed, I am very sympathetic to the view expressed by Weyl [9] 
and Brouwer: 
Essentially more radical and a further step toward pure constructivism is Brouwer’s intuitionistic 
mathematics. Brouwer made it clear, as 1 think beyond any doubt, that there is no evidence 
supporting the belief in the existential character of the totality of all natural numbers, The 
sequence of numbers which grows beyond any stage alread) reached by passing to the next 
number, is a manifold of possibilities open towards infinity; it remains forever in the status of 
creation, but is not a closed realm of things existing in themsel\es. That we blindly converted one 
into the other is the true source of our difficulties, including the antinomies - a source of more 
fundamental nature than Russell’s vicious circle principle indicated. Brouwer opened our eyes 
and made us see how far classical mathematics, nourished by a belief in the “absolute” that 
transcends all human possibilities of realization , goes beyond such statements as can claim real 
meaning and truth founded on evidence. According to his \ieiv and reading of history, classical 
logic \vas abstracted from the mathematics of finite sets and their subsets. (The word finite is here 
to be taken in the precise sense that the members of such a set are explicitly exhibited one by one.) 
Forgetful of this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic for something above and prior 
to all mathematics, and finally applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of infinite 
sets. This is the Fall and original sin of set-theory, for Hhich it is justly punished by the 
antinomies. Not that such contradictions showed up is surprisin g, but that they showed up at such 
a late stage of the game! 
Thanks to the notion of “Wahlfolge.” that is a sequence in sruf14 nascendi in which one number 
after the other is freely chosen rather than determined by law, Brouwer’s treatment of real 
variables is in the closest harmony with the intuitive nature of the continuum; this is one of the 
most attractive features of his theory. But on the u hole, Brouwer’s mathematics is less simple and 
much more limited in power than our familiar “existential” mathematics. It is for this reason that 
the vast majority of mathematicians hesitate to go along with his radical reform. 
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The method of presentation of categories provides some constructive content to 
Category Theory. It seems to me one can go a long way - in descriptive power - 
with just ‘, I, 0, 1, + and x . 
There are some who would deny out of hand the possibility of (2) on the ground 
that theoretical computer science is not mathematics. But this view of mathematics, 
it seems to me, is too static and limited. To those I strongly recommend reading 
Aleksandrov’s article “A General View of Mathematics” in [IO]. Here is a sample 
(p. 18): 
Why does arithmetic have such wide application in spite of the abstractness of its concepts? 
The answer is simple. The concepts and conclusions of arithmetic, which generalize an 
enormous amount of experience, reflect in abstract form those relationships in the actual world 
that are met with constantly and everywhere. It is possible to count the objects in a room, the 
stars, people, atoms, and so forth. Arithmetic considers certain of their general properties, in 
abstraction from everything particular and concrete, and it is precisely because it considers only 
these general properties that its conclusions are applicable to so many cases. The possibility of 
wide application is guaranteed by the very abstractness of arithmetic, although it is important 
here that this abstraction is not an empty one but is derived from long practical experience. The 
same is true for all mathematics, and for any abstract concept or theory. The possibilities for 
application of a theory depend on the breadth of the original material which it generalizes. 
Reflecting on a comment I’ve heard more than once concerning Category Theory 
to the effect that “it’s just a language,” I’m a bit amused for, it seems to me now, 
this may be its greatest strength. 
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